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Abstract: The article begins with an analysis of the concept of identity and a description of two theoretical traditions which lie at the source of this concept and which determine the operationalisations of the identity concept within the context of social change (G.H. Mead and E. Erikson). The author then goes on to discuss the problems which evolve from the many applications of the concept of identity to analysis of collectives. The concept of collective identity is outlined and four basic ways of understanding this concept in contemporary sociology are discussed. The author refers in his presentation to the works of F. Barth, R. Turner, A. Touraine, S.N. Eisenstadt, E. Gellner, and A. Kłoskowska. The author concludes his article with several comments focusing on the relationships between social change and collective identity and he refers to those approaches which either stress the relative independence of identity formulae and social structure or even view the evolving patterns of identity as a factor contributing to social change.

Our interest in the processes of social change often causes us to refer to phenomena which we tend to call, for example, "responses to the threat of loss of identity." At other times we take notice of attempts to "maintain identity" and on still other occasions we speak of "forming a new identity" or "rejecting one's identity." Our observations frequently refer to circumstances which are important in the life of the community. Here identity is either a value which is significant for individuals and the community or an explanatory variable which needs to be taken into account or which helps us understand behaviour.

Yet, when we leave loose diagnosis behind and wish to design more systematic forms of investigation, several problems emerge. We must define the range of the identity concept, ways of operationalizing this concept and, consequently, the reasons for using the concept of identity of the social actor in our analysis of social change. And finally we must determine the extent to which it will be possible to observe new aspects of social change if we introduce this terms. These questions will be the focus of the present article.

Two Source Models of Identity Theory

Let us begin with a few comments on the concept of identity. We do not intend to present a ramified discussion of the ambiguity of the identity concept, nor do we wish to review the various approaches, orientations and

definitions. However, it is not possible to resign completely from a few comments on the various definitions of identity of the social actor, if only to avoid the most basic misunderstandings. However, we shall limit these to the essential minimum.

Let us assume that identity of the individual social actor (the primary reference point in our theory) can be understood as a set of images, opinions and beliefs which the individual social actor constructs when faced with the task of self-definition. A similar concise definition may sometimes be found in the literature. A. Brittan, for example, defines identity as "...a symbolic interpretation in which the individual makes reference to whom he/she believes he/she is and whom he/she hopes to be" (Brittain 1977: 102). Ch. Gordon and E.J. Gergen, on the other hand, are even more laconic: it is a set of self-definitions made by the social actor (Gordon & Gergen 1983: 3). As we know, these easily achieved general definitions of identity do not preclude very serious differences in opinion resulting in a whole range of variations of the concept. As we already mentioned we do not intend to analyze these issues thoroughly here. Within the framework of this article a much more legitimate objective will be to try to decide whether the sum of achievements with respect to reflections on the identity of the social actor are of any use in the analysis of social change.

If we were to try to gain insight into the fundamental differences between the various approaches to identity theory we would note that references are frequently made in the literature to the dual roots of these conceptualizations.

This idea is fundamental in the approach of M. Fortes who, in his discussion of the place of identity theory in the social sciences, distinguished two theoretical foci, one associated with the name of G.H. Mead, the other with the name of E. Erikson (Fortes 1983: 393). Mead is associated with interest in specific interactions in small groups and situational analyses of identity. Of course when we say "Mead" this is a short-cut which actually refers to a specific branch of study marked by the specific theoretical achievements of W. James, J.M. Baldwin and Ch.H. Cooley. When we say "Erikson," on the other hand, we mean a biographical approach to identity (vide the 8-step "life cycle") and its relations to changes in social macrostructures (Erikson 1963; also Witkowski 1989).

Without continuing these references to the literature any further let us state that this fragment of reflection on the identity of the social actor, initiated and developed within the interactionist tradition, reveals rather limited references to social change, understood in accordance with W.F. Ogburne's earlier suggestions as a process of structural transformation of the social system. Long before Erikson, the interactionists studied individual identity in their own specific way. Erikson's work, on the other hand, inspired a different type of research perspective and therefore led to the formulation of a different theory of identity. What was so specific about the interactionists' approach that we should treat a considerable portion of their work selectively when applying it to the analysis of social change? In our opinion, the interactionists' research was primarily situated within the confines of the area of investigation which can be described in terms of a list of problems and interests related to solving theoretical queries focused on one question: how is interaction possible?

With such goals in mind, attempts have been made to operationalize the concepts of "generalized other" and "significant other" in order to study the development of an individual identity in the subject; Anselm L. Strauss in his *Mirrors and Masks* analyzed the polymorphous nature of the individual's sense of identity whereas Erving Goffman in his *Stigma* sought to confirm three universal variants or levels of operations of individual identity: social identity, personal identity and self-identity. In other words, social change is not the branch of sociological investigation to provide appropriate application of the significant, interactionist fragment of contemporary theory of identity of the social actor.

Individual Identity According to E. Erikson

The sense of this statement becomes increasingly clearer the more thoroughly we analyze the evolution of Erikson's approach. Erikson focused the attention of researchers in many disciplines on a specific fragment of the individual's psycho-social dispositions which he called identity. Its significant attributes were permanence from the moment it was formed in one's early years of life. Erikson believed that the individual's personality developed in the area of fusion (or the "cutting-point") of the basic aspects of the individual's existence, i.e., his/her psycho-physiological capacities, aspirations and opportunities on the one hand with social roles and the prototypes of careers offered by society on the other hand. Accumulated failures to develop an identity were thought to lead to so-called "identity diffusion," i.e., lack of achievement of a certain degree of stability of self-definition and, in effect, lack of elaboration of rules of self-direction and a series of accompanying psychological consequences (lack of sense of fulfillment, lack of sense of existence, criminal tendencies). At the same time Erikson sought for the factors which impede the formation of individual identity in changing social structures.

Erikson's research project, which legitimated the individual self-image as a significant field of psycho-social study, opened the way for the psycho-social analysis of changing macrostructures. It had another pertinent feature as well. It contained the implicit postulate that one should analyze one's identity and the important claim, essentially related to philosophy of life, that this sphere of experience is an important element of life.

But, on the other hand, we must mention that by introducing the concept of identity Erikson merely meant to broaden the repertory of concepts already used without intending to question the utility of existing concepts such as social role, social character or social personality. Analysis with the help of the identity concept was to enable more thorough description of the individual's situation and understanding of his/her behaviour. For example let us recall here Erikson's statement concerning the bonds between individuals with "diffuse identities" and radical political movements based on the spectacular rejection of various types of "outsiders." Such bonds allegedly existed because such individuals could confirm their affiliation to the group, whose boundaries were clearly defined, and which offered them a substitute "group identity." Thus the behaviour of "free-floaters," for example – as S. Czarnowski had previously labelled such people – could be clearly related to the properties of the social structure.

New Theoretical and Philosophy-of-Life Contexts for Identity Theory

Erikson's ideas, which suggested new conceptual instruments, underwent considerable further transformations. New ways of understanding the identity of the social actor were proposed, which introduced new aspects, new methodological suggestions as well as new philosophy-of-life and political contents into Erikson's original project. Quite a number of these new suggestions were related to the problems of social change.

First and foremost we must indicate here that the post-Eriksonian concept of identity of the social actor emerged in our days as a specific conclusion and methodological postulate which sprung from consideration of the nature and properties of social change, experienced in particular by those societies which have left the industrial phase of development behind them.

In their book *Social Construction of Reality* Berger and Luckmann introduce, as we recall, the concept of "unfortunate socialization" as the consequence of increasing complexity of the division of labour and the equally increasingly complex distribution of power. Those responsible for socializing the individual become increasingly more diversified and therefore present the individual with inconsistent identification formulae and incompatible images of the world. This apparently leads to various forms of actualization of the question: Who am I? in an ever greater number of members of contemporary societies. To the more and more pressing problem of identity and to the delegation of the process of identity-formation to private individuals who act within the context of progressing delegitimization of the global system of meanings which legitimate the global plan of social order. However, the whole business does not end with the individual finding a way out of this "unfortunate socialization." When, at the beginning of the eighties, Renaud Sansaulieu summarized his observations collected over many years of studies of work, social differentiation and occupations, he indicated the increasingly clearer justification for inclusion of the term "identity" in the sociological vocabulary. Analyses of systems, structures and ideologies are no longer sufficient for delineation of the boundaries of social categories, groups and life styles. External, deeply consolidated ways of describing the individual by means of grades, functions, occupations and diplomas are no longer sufficient bases for understanding their behaviour. Therefore it is not too clear how people should be characterized and how to name the situations in which they are involved. Sansaulieu, the author of the book we are discussing here, concludes his reflections with the following statement: "...contemporary society is having trouble with divergences and its significant socio-political problem is probably how to create institutional constructions which permit other forms of relations than the ones which functioned previously, to create culture and indicate the individual's place in society. But this emergence of cultural factors as an autonomic dimension of social reproduction moves sociology close to its limits." (Sansaulieu 1980:285).

A. Touraine formulates more radical suggestions in the face of similarly perceived results of social change. The intricate pattern of the individual's group affiliations and modes of social identification, which are far from being unambiguous, call for research on the process of emergence of the (individual and collective) social actor and for the conscious participation of this actor in

the creation of his/her own self-definition, says Touraine. The latter may run counter to deeply-rooted ways of locating the individual in social structure. This statement is supplemented with the paradoxical claim that sociology will create its own object of investigation when it ousts the concept of social role from its vocabulary and introduces the concept of identity instead. Role assumes the existence of somehow prearranged partner expectations, generally shared norms and patterns of behaviour and, as a consequence, a consensual vision of society. Meanwhile, social relations are always full of discrepancies as to how the social actors understand their location in social space. These relations take place among actors whose interests are at odds with each other. These conflicts of interests are most fully embodied in the sphere of construction of rival global models of the functioning of society (historicity). Social actors are therefore bound by global models of social functioning which vary in complexity and emerge from social movements. The social actor supplements these social relations with his/her own identity, constructed in the course of participation in the social movement. Only the concept of identity (as defined above) – says Touraine – enables the fullest analysis of the dynamics of contemporary social phenomena, phenomena which are replete with manifestations of contestations, departure from official ideologies, the questioning of ascribed obligations and the propagation of new life styles (Touraine 1974:47).

The solutions proposed by Berger, Luckman, Sansaulieu, Touraine and many other writers indirectly answer the question which may be formulated as follows: do we need a new concept to describe the same social reality differently or is what we encounter here are qualitatively different ways of existence of individuals in society and different forms of the same society. One author formulates this problem in the following way: do we need a new decanter for familiar wine, or are we perhaps looking for a new decanter for a quite new brand of wine, produced from grapes which have grown in quite different conditions than before? The above-mentioned authors (and not only they) opt for the second alternative. Therefore, the concept of identity is intended as a conceptual tool which is indispensable for the description of a phase of social change for which the "old" conceptual instrumentarium is inadequate or pronouncedly less efficient.

The Problem of Collective Identity

Another problem emerges here. The theoretical perspective which implies focus on social change apparently forces us to make an extremely inconvenient generalization of the concept of identity, one which makes it possible to apply the concept to the collective as well (or perhaps above all).

In this case we speak of group or collective identity. Any attempt to translate such concepts into the language of empirical research forces us to introduce quite significant modifications to the traditional meanings of the concept of identity. The question arises, suggested by the canonical understanding of identity: who is the producer or the carrier of the identity and what sorts of constructs may we justifiably accept as the identity of this or that collective? We can essentially find two approaches to this issue in the literature.

A. Kłosowska, who is interested in national identity – which undoubtedly can be viewed as a form of collective identity – represents the following opinion: “When introducing the concept of collective identity we must elaborate the conceptual apparatus and research apparatus anew, and in a different way than before. None of the social collectivities to which the concept of identity may be applied has such a thing as a mental organ of self-knowledge, capable of producing something which could be viewed as an exact counterpart of personal self-awareness. The nineteenth-century organicist theories which say that the social organism is equipped with a collective sensorium are quite unacceptable today. However, if this type of theory is merely treated as a metaphor, it is possible to supplement it in empirical practice with definitions of the functions of intellectual elites, pattern-forming groups or, finally, national centre and mainstream culture, the legitimate and dominant culture (Kłosowska 1992: 132).

Let us pause for a moment on the question of national identity (although the whole problem naturally goes beyond the limits of collective identity). We must mention that E. Gellner adopts a similar stand-point when he explains that national identity is the result of complex constructive endeavours, launched by intellectuals who express nationalist tendencies (Gellner 1991: 64). Let us call this orientation within the collective identity approach the “sociological” orientation because it makes references to studies of the social processes of emergence of circles of creators of collective identity as the basis for discussing the properties of collective identity. We must also mention a characteristic feature of this form of collective identity: it must conceal the fact that it has been constructed because this suggests that it is arbitrary. Arbitrariness, in turn, is incompatible with the majority of the functions of collective identity (if, e.g., it is to be used in diplomatic negotiations aimed at achieving sovereignty by some emergent national group).

Apart from the orientation on which we have commented above, there is another approach which, for lack of a better term, we shall call the “anthropological” approach. It is “anthropological” because its characteristic feature is the belief that the collective identity of a given collectivity develops “naturally” from the characteristics of members of that collectivity. Everyone can observe and describe it. This is possible because the features and properties of collective identity manifest themselves in the behaviour and thinking of the members of the collectivity. An appropriately motivated, systematic participant observer of the life of the collectivity is able to identify these so-called “typical” attributes and to generalize them in the form of a model of collective identity of the group.

A significant element of the assumptions underlying research in this case is the belief that identity attributes are evenly distributed in the whole group, among all its members. There is no room in this approach for distinguishing a group of creators of identity. At best, there may be better and worse informers or more or less aware carriers of the identity. In this approach there is also belief in the cognitive effectiveness of thinking in terms of homology between individual identity and collective identity. The latter is essentially a repetition of the general outlines of the identities of the individuals of which the collective is made up.

The investigator who reconstructs national identity in the attempt to describe “Germanness,” “Englishness” or “Polishness” is taking the anthropol-

ological "route." A. Kłoskowska describes this approach as follows: "...Polishness is – as Stanisław Ossowski would have said – a conceptual conglomerate made up of many diverse elements: generalized patterns of actual behaviours of Polish society as well as norms and models focused on the shaping of actions. At the core of this concept are the values, myths and stereotypes inherent in human consciousness and consolidated and objectivized in literature, the arts, ideologies, legends, historiography, and scientific theories" (Kłoskowska 1990: 5).

This variation of the "anthropological" approach may be called the "emic" type, i.e., a type which refers to the perspective of a member or carrier of the given culture. There is also another variant described in the literature, the "etic" type which refers to procedures proper for the "external observer's" perspective in the strict sense. This latter perspective seems much more appropriate for the analysis of social change, but because it is "etic" it rejects part of the meaning references associated with the canonical approach to identity. Particularly the fragment which refers to conscious relations between individuals and collectivities with concrete cultural contents and certain emotional states evoked by these contents. Characteristically, those authors who select this route reject the term "identity," preferring other terms. They reject it because the constructs which result from their research are at odds with the various manifestations of the social actors' self-definitions. This was probably what induced J.H. Marx to comment that when studying identity one must distinguish between "...abstract, conceptual formulas relating to identity and symbolically expressed models of identity which emerge in the sphere of culture and these in turn should be distinguished from subjectively experienced sense of I-in-relation-to-reality in which people are more and more interested, i.e., from identity" (Marx 1980: 151).

R. Turner's work is an example of the above-mentioned "etic"-type anthropological procedures. Turner applies the concept of "real-self" in his analyses (Turner 1976; Turner & Schutte 1981). By real-self he means all those contents which are related to the subject, which the subject considers to be "close to him" or which belong to him and which allow him to distance himself from alien elements or those distant from "himself." Thinking in terms of the real-self, says Turner, allows us to notice a very important transformation in the mode of existence of the individual in contemporary, highly-developed societies. We may observe an increasingly more distinct shift from "institution" to "impulse" as the focus of attributes making up the self-definitions of individuals, constructed in various contexts. "Institution" means achievement, control, respect for normative standards, the future. "Impulse" means doing what you want, loosening or rejecting inhibitions, being "yourself," living in the here-and-now. The departure from the "institutional" pole and movement in direction of the "impulse" pole is allegedly caused by the fact that society's institutional infrastructure is losing its "reality." This is because significant transformations have come about in the sphere of social structures. Group life, organized around production and mutual protection, has given way to organization of social life organized around consumer groups which prefer a different view of what is real and significant for the individual. It is easier to comprehend many behaviours, life strategies, tastes and esthetic preferences characteristic of the younger generation if we take

into account the increasing impact of the "impulse" principle in organizing general self-perception.

V. Kavolis, on the other hand (we shall discuss his approach later), introduces the concept of "logics of selfhood" into his cross-cultural comparatistics. These he defines as "...the most basic alternatives which determine what it essentially means to «be a person»" (Kavolis 1980:42). The logics of selfhood are made up of the symbolic resources which civilizations have developed in the course of their existence and whose function it is to provide the subject with the means for self-understanding, self-comprehension and self-direction. It is also noteworthy that Kavolis emphasizes that self-logics are usually implicit (i.e., we reconstruct them on the basis of "etic"-type procedures).

We may respond to understandable reservations, questioning whether it is justified to combine this type of research with the problems of identity, by saying that we have to do here merely with a different formula for the generalization of research findings of a clearly more abstract level. The objectives and cognitive functions of these research findings are very similar to the traditional focus on the identity of the social actor. In the long run, analyses which utilize several thousand TST Questionnaires are also intended to lead to the formulation of general propositions on identity (cf. Klineberg & Zavalloni 1969).

Identity: Continuity or Distinctiveness?

The next problem related to the utilization of identity theories in the analysis of social change is a function of basic, unique meaning of the concept of identity.

The identity concept implies a characteristic interpretational dualism. P. Ricoeur mentions that the concept of identity indicates two closely related problems. One is "la memete," i.e., the problem of maintenance of continuity by the individual, the stability of characteristic features despite the passage of time and mutable contingencies. The second is "l'ipseite," i.e., the problem of distinctiveness of the self from other people, the individual's unique characteristics which constitute this distinctiveness (cf. Bauman 1993:8). This difference is clearly noted by other authors as well.

A. Jacobson-Widding believes that identity has two distinct shades of meaning. One refers to continuity or remaining the same (sameness). The other refers to distinctiveness, being different (Jacobson-Widding 1983:13). It is worth emphasizing that the former interpretation, i.e., continuity, was clearly noticeable in Erikson's project. It is also worth adding that, in our opinion, the whole problem is one of aspects or emphasis, not to say connotations rather than different meanings. Usually in concrete applications of the term "identity" one connotation comes to the fore at the cost of the other, although it does not eliminate it completely from the range of meanings of the concept. This meaning will probably always be present if no appropriate restrictive projective definition is proposed.

By combining the two "dimensions" discussed above we have a better chance of grasping the characteristic features of different approaches:

	"anthropological approach"	"sociological approach"
"sameness"		
"distinctiveness"		

Our problem is clearer in this context. We are therefore asking what has happened to the concept of identity whose dominant interpretation induces us to focus on continuity or stability, i.e., lack of change.

In post-Eriksonian approaches, especially those which developed with the study of collective identities in mind, the problem of stability or continuity of a certain pattern as a dominant reference point for the concept identity has clearly lost significance. Is this because we now think in terms of social change? I think so.

J.H. Marx presents quite a typical opinion on this matter: "Perhaps stability and continuity of individual identity were something ubiquitous in the past – although I do not think this is probable – but it is becoming increasingly clear that they are very difficult, if not entirely impossible to achieve in the rapidly changing contemporary world. A stabile identity, continued over the entire life-span, not only seems atypical, it even seems socially pathological and clearly not typical in post-industrial, post-modernist society... because the principal difference between post-modernist social life, based on knowledge, consists in the fact that an increasing number of people (educated during increasingly longer periods) are adopting an investigating-reflective stance; these people conceive themselves and their identities as objects which are submitted to intentional modifications and they are beginning to make fully aware and deliberate attempts at psychological transformation of the social reconstruction of their own selves" (Marx 1980 : 184).

Group Boundaries and Identity

So in what direction are modifications of the identity concept aiming – the concept which, it is believed, may be useful in the analysis of social change? Is the dominant course in the interpretation of the concept of identity not shifting towards the second shade of meaning described above, i.e., the distinctiveness dimension? The answer is probably positive. We must add, however, that acceptance of the increasing significance of the "distinctiveness" dimension suggests a further question, i.e., what formulae of identity construction are accepted by the social actors who take this route and what are the methodological implications of this "shift" in interpretation of the basic meaning of the concept of identity?

Important guidelines as to how to answer these questions are scattered in the literature. Without pretending to review them exhaustively we would nevertheless like to draw attention to several approaches which, in our opinion, are noteworthy.

When F. Barth took up the problem of ethnic identity in the sixties he formulated the following opinion in his book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1964), now considered an antropological classic: there is no ethnic identity if

there is no contrast between "us" and "them." We define ourselves largely by reference to what we are not. This operation is possible because we know who others are and in what ways we differ from them. Barth disagrees with the claim that the central focus of interest of the anthropologist who studies ethnic group identity is the community of shared culture and the resultant search for adequate ways of its expression. Adequate, i.e., ones which expose the ethnic identity of the group through synthetic description of its culture.

According to Barth, we should seek instead those factors which are socially significant or effective. Factors which count in the interactive experiences of members of the ethnic group. "From this point of view the basic object of investigation is the ethnic 'boundary' which defines the group, not the entire cultural material encompassed by that boundary. Of course, the boundaries to which we should pay attention are boundaries in the social sense, although they may have territorial counterparts. Therefore, if a group maintains its identity, its members, when relating with outsiders, must have appropriate criteria allowing them to define their group membership and ways of manifesting this membership as well as principles which enabling exclusion from the group" (Barth 1964: 15).

This idea that the identity of the social actor and the identities of individuals cum members of a social movement are formed in opposition to progressive definition of the adversary is also an important element in A. Touraine's theory. According to Touraine, the identity of the social actor develops via participation in a social movement, i.e., via a sequence of social conflicts progressing from a vague, dimly outlined whole to a set of crystallized beliefs. The need to define the adversary plays an important role here. No social movement can be organized if the enemy is not somehow indicated and named. Conflict – says Touraine – causes the enemy to "emerge" (i.e., become more clearly delineated) parallel to the development of the identity of the actors on both conflicting sides (Touraine 1977).

The idea that identity is constructed in opposition to "others" also lies at the base of S.N. Eisenstadt and B. Giesen's theory of collective identities. This theory is a good exemplification of the conceptual reorientation signalled earlier and provides a formula for the description of collective identity which is worth consideration.

Both these authors view collective identity as a set of general attributes characteristic of a given collective. Identity does not emerge "naturally" from group properties but is the product of some "collective author" who proposes a certain form of discourse on the identity of the group in question. Collective identity is produced by constructing boundaries and demarcations. By constructing demarcation lines between what is "within" and what is "without," between "we" and "they," these boundaries help construct images of both "we" and "they." The construction of these demarcation lines, boundaries or divisions is based on the assumption that there are symbolic codes which steer such distinctions. These codes are the essential elements of processes of construction of collective identities. These identities emerge, are maintained and transformed as an integral part of the process of construction of basic between-group divisions. The attempt to reach a typology of these codes is the basic aim of both authors. Let us add that S.N. Eisenstadt and B. Giesen, having analyzed relative diverse materials, came up with a description of three

basic types of collective identity codes. They gave them characteristic names suggestive of distinct procedures of boundary-construction: primordiality, civility and transcendence or sacredness (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1993).

Identity Formation and Social Structure: Dependence or Autonomy?

The approach adopted by Eisenstadt and Giesen leads us towards another question. By considering the process of identity creation in terms of code it is possible to assume that these processes are relatively autonomous. The majority of approaches and studies assume that changes in identity of the social actor are secondary with respect to changes in social macrostructure, the division of labour and general civilizational changes, all of which are viewed as primary-order factors. Identity is merely an epiphenomenon in relation to these factors.

But there are also authors who assume that identity evolves with considerable autonomy. Several of these authors are even willing to claim that, in certain circumstances, inventiveness with respect to the shaping of identity formulae may largely determine the direction of global, social changes.

In his theory of post-modernist models of identity, J.H. Marx, quoted earlier, assumes that four analytic dimensions or levels of society may be distinguished:

1. material-demographic-ecological
2. social-structural-institutional
3. cognitive culture
4. expressive culture.

Each of these basic dimensions changes or evolves at different rates at different periods of time. Marx believes that the sixties were the beginning of an acceleration of changes in expressive culture, at the centre of which lie models and meanings which combine into collective and individual identities, as well as symbolic patterns which are the building blocks for shared forms of social consciousness and religious interpretations, evaluations and rituals. At the same time post-industrial, post-modernist society has considerably stable and rigid institutional structures. Alongside the above-mentioned rapid tempo of change and specific experimentation in the realm of expressive culture we may observe tendencies towards "psychological utopia" and therefore Marx suggests that social movements, organized around the problems generated by expressive culture, may lead to institutional changes in society (Marx 1980).

Another example of this point of view is Vytautas Kavolis's "logics of selfhood" theory. Kavolis, who is interested in changes in cultural systems, described four basic "logics of selfhood":

1. The logic of the unique pattern of enduring internal coherence;
2. The logic of coincidence of the subjectively sensed core of experience with the essential structure of fundamental quality of the universe to which the concrete individual is oriented;
3. The logic of "peak-experiences";
4. The logic of true self as a process of casual encounters by an individual with external situations.

Kavolis then goes on to seek the regularities governing the sphere of emergence of certain sequences of these "logics," both within the dimension of individual biographies and in society at large, although he emphasizes that these

processes have considerable autonomy. At the same time he draws attention to their reciprocal effect on many spheres of social life (Kavolis 1980). Perhaps it is worth mentioning in conclusion that the idea that those countries which have left the industrial phase of development behind have favourable circumstances for "creativity" and experimentation with new identity formulae has been maintained in sociology with various persistence for at least two decades (cf. Bell 1994).

In our discussion of the role of sociological theories of identity of the social actor in analyses of social change we first took up the problem of two different orientations in the "identity" tradition, orientations marked by the names of Mead and Erikson. We then described the post-Eriksonian wave of reflection on identity and exposed its ties with the social changes of the last few decades. Next we directed our attention towards basic orientations in the study of collective identity and this led us to the distinction of four types or approaches to the study of this phenomenon. And finally we commented on the characteristic shift of focus in contemporary approaches to collective identity which have led to the emphasis of relative independence of the processes of construction of collective identity from social structure.

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